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Reforming Campaign Finance Reform:
A Review of Voting with Dollars
Richard Briffaultt
INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") into law.' The culmination of a
six-year legislative and political struggle, BCRA works the most compre-
hensive change in federal campaign finance law in nearly three decades.
BCRA addresses a broad range of issues, including soft money, issue-
advocacy advertising, fundraising on federal property, campaign activities
of foreign nationals, and penalties for violation of campaign finance laws.
Enacted in the face of intense political opposition, BCRA, if it stands up in
court, is a significant reform achievement.
Or is it? BCRA closely follows the main lines of campaign finance
regulation set out in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (collectively
"FECA")2 : disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures; limits
on individual contributions to candidates, political action committees
("PACs"), and parties; limits on contributions by PACs and parties to can-
didates; and prohibitions on campaign contributions and expenditures by
business corporations and labor unions. BCRA plugs many of the gaps that
emerged in FECA's structure as Federal Election Commission ("FEC")
and Supreme Court decisions eroded FECA's provisions, and politicians,
interest groups, and donors found new ways of raising and spending cam-
paign money that undermined FECA's requirements, restrictions, and
Copyright © 2003 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
t Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
I. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
2. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002).
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prohibitions. By subjecting soft money3 and issue advocacy4 to regulation,
BCRA essentially restores the status quo ante of campaign finance law of
the early 1980s.
This may well be a step forward. FECA's disclosure requirements and
limitations on campaign money continued to command public support even
as the law was flouted in practice.' Moreover, the evasions and fine legal
3. "Soft money" is a campaign finance term used in contrast with "hard money." "Hard money"
describes money raised and spent to aid candidates for federal office or political parties with respect to
their federal campaigns, in compliance with the disclosure rules, dollar limitations, source prohibitions,
and other FECA requirements, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55. However, some expenditures that have
recognizable benefits for federal candidates are-due to statutory definitions, federal administrative
action, or judicial decision-considered beyond the scope of FECA and may be funded with money not
subject to FECA's constraints. Such money is called "soft money." For example, a state party's get-out-
the-vote drive for federal candidates must be funded with hard money. But if the party mounts the get-
out-the-vote drive on behalf of the party's entire ticket-federal and state candidates together-it may
fund a considerable portion of the cost attributable to the state candidates with soft money. As a result,
the party can accept contributions in amounts larger than federal law would permit and accept
contributions from entities like business corporations and labor unions otherwise forbidden from
making contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections, and the party can use those
funds for activities that aid federal candidates. See generally Richard Briffault, The Political Parties
and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 628-31 (2000) (hereinafter Political
Parties).
4. "Issue advocacy" is a campaign finance term used in contrast with "express advocacy."
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, only "expenditures for communications that
in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" may be subject to
regulation. See 424 U.S. I, 44, 79-80 (1976). As a result, disclosure requirements, contribution
restrictions, and expenditure prohibitions apply only to funds used to pay for express advocacy. "Issue
advocacy" describes campaign communications that can effectively support or oppose a candidate but,
because they avoid the language of express advocacy, are exempt from campaign finance restrictions.
For example, a television advertisement that sharply criticizes a candidate's voting record, and then
urges the listener to call the advertiser for "more information" but refrains from using words that
literally advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, is considered to be issue advocacy and is exempt
from federal campaign finance regulation. See generally Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing
the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999) (hereinafter Issue Advocacy).
5. FECA's source prohibitions and dollar limitations have been significantly eviscerated by the
rise of soft money. FECA prohibits corporations and labor unions from making contributions in
connection with federal election campaigns. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). Prior to BCRA's enactment, the
law also limited contributions to candidates to $1,000 per election from individual donors and $5,000
per election from political committees; contributions to the national committees of the political parties
were limited to $20,000 per individual per year. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 44la(a)(l)(A), (B), (C). In the 1996
election, however, 390 individuals or organizations (including business corporations and labor unions)
gave $100,000 or more to the soft-money accounts of the two major political parties-money that could
be used to aid federal candidates. See Political Parties, supro note 3, at 631. During the 1999-2000
election cycle, soft-money donations to the two major political parties amounted to $495 million, or
40% of total party fundraising. Of this amount, approximately $300 million (or 60% of total soft money
and 25% of total party fundraising) came from just 800 donors, indicating that the average gift from
these top donors was $375,000 or wildly in excess of federal contribution limitations. Many large
donations came from corporations and unions that are barred from making contributions for federal
election purposes. See Richard Briffault, Soft Money Reform and the Constitution, I ELECTION L.J.
343, 345-46 (2002).
The rise of issue advocacy has undermined federal disclosure requirements as well as the limits on
corporate and union participation in federal election campaigns. According to a study by the Brennan
Center, interest groups spent almost $42 million on electioneering issue-advocacy television advertising
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distinctions that gave rise to soft money and issue advocacy make a mock-
ery of campaign finance law and have had a broader, demoralizing effect
on campaign finance regulation.6
Yet BCRA fails to address the fundamental problem with our cam-
paign finance system: the need for funding sufficient to enable candidates
to mount competitive races without rendering them unduly dependent on
large donors. In our large and heterogeneous society, it takes a consider-
able amount of money for candidates and others interested in an election to
communicate their views to the voters. "Money buys all the things crucial
for a modem election campaign" 7-broadcast and radio airtime, printing
and mailing campaign literature, transportation, office space, data-
processing equipment and computer time, and the services of campaign
professionals. Voters receive most of their information concerning the can-
didates from advertising funded by candidates, parties, political commit-
tees, and other groups. Campaign finance, thus, is crucial for both
candidate communication and voter education.
In the United States today, most campaigns are funded by private do-
nations. Although private dollars have been the basis for campaigns since
before the start of the Republic, private funding breeds certain pathologies.
A handful of wealthy individuals and interest groups play an enormous
role-wildly disproportionate to their share of the electorate-in funding
our election campaigns. Less than one-tenth of 1% of the population
in the 2000 federal election campaign. See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLAUGHLIN, BUYING TIME
2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTION 15 (2002). These ads were not
subject to FECA's provisions requiring the reporting and disclosure of the identities of persons and
organizations spending above a relatively low threshold amount concerning federal candidates. Id
6. The distinction between hard money and soft money is based on the determination of the
Federal Election Commission ("FEC") that a significant portion of the funds given to state parties and
spent to support federal and state candidates together may be treated as beyond the scope of federal law
because state candidates benefit from the spending. See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (1978) (finding
that a state party could use funds impermissible under FECA to defray the "nonfederal" portion of
administrative overhead, voter registration, and voter mobilization expenses). The FEC has also held
that national party committees can set up accounts for the deposit and disbursement of funds otherwise
impermissible under FECA to finance the "nonfederal" portion of a combined federal-state
expenditure. FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17 (1979). As a result, even the national parties' congressional
campaign committees-committees created for the express purpose of aiding House and Senate
candidates-have been able to raise and spend "nonfederal" money. In the 1999-2000 election cycle,
the four congressional campaign committees (House and Senate Democrats and House and Senate
Republicans) together raised and spent in excess of $325 million in funds that did not comply with
FECA's limitations, prohibitions, and requirements. See FEC, National Party Non-federal Activity
Through the Complete Two Year Election Cycle, at http://www.fec.gov/press/
051501partyfund/tables/nonfedsumm2000.html. For a critique of the role of the FEC in authorizing soft
money, see PROJECT FEC, No BARK, No BITE, No POINT: THE CASE FOR CLOSING THE FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION AND ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING THE NATION'S CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAWS 81-95 (2002).
7. Comm'n on Campaign Fin. Reform, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Dollars and
Democracy: A Blueprint for Campaign Finance Reform 84 (2000).
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provides 36% of all individual donations to candidates.8 Nor is this group
demographically or politically representative of the rest of the electorate. 9
Private funding gives the affluent a disproportionate role in election cam-
paigns and is, thus, in tension with the norm of one person, one vote.'"
Private funding may potentially distort government decision making.
When candidates depend on private donations, large donors and prospec-
tive donors may obtain special access, and their views and concerns may
be given extra weight. This may involve not outright vote buying, but more
subtle opportunities to participate more extensively and more effectively in
influencing official actions. The Supreme Court has referred to this as "the
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual
financial contributions." '
Private funding also usually fails to produce financially competitive
elections. Challengers, newcomers, political outsiders, and those without
backing from wealthy constituencies have a harder time raising funds and
mounting competitive campaigns. With many donors using their contribu-
tions to secure access to elected officials, incumbents or those perceived
likely to win do better at raising funds from the relatively small pool of
affluent, politically active donors than do their opponents. The built-in ad-
vantages of incumbency are, thus, reinforced by the private funding sys-
tem. 2
Three regulatory techniques that together form the core of campaign
finance law-disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures,
8. In the 1996 federal election, approximately 235,000 donors, or less than one-tenth of 1% of
the population, contributed $1,000 or more, for a total of $477 million to candidates and political
parties, or 36% of the total individual contributions in that election. A slightly larger group of 630,000
people-or about one-quarter of 1% of the population-made contributions of $200 or more, for a total
of $597 million, or 45% of total individual contributions. See Center for Responsive Politics, The Big
Picture: Where the Money Came From in the 1996 Elections, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/
bigpicture/overview/bpoverview.htm.
9. Id. According to a national survey conducted in 1997 of more than 1,100 donors who gave
$200 or more to congressional candidates in 1996, 46% of the donors had family incomes of $250,000
or more, and 81% had family incomes of $100,000 or more; 95% were white; 81% were male; 47%
were over the age of 60 and 87% were over the age of 45; 61% were in business, law, medicine, or
another profession; 44% had a graduate degree; 51% described themselves as slightly to extremely
conservative (compared with 31% who described themselves as slightly to extremely liberal); and 48%
described themselves as ranging from "lean Republican" to "strong Republican" (compared with 31%
who described themselves as ranging from "lean Democrat" to "strong Democrat"). See John Green et
al., Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthi. Conservative and Reform-Minded
(1998), http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/donors/donors.htm.
10. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("the conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, ene vote.").
1I. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,26-27 (1976).
12. See Comm'n on Campaign Fin. Reform, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra
note 7, at 65-71 (2002) (describing large number of financially noncompetitive congressional
elections).
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limits on contributions, and public funding for candidates-have been de-
veloped to address the problems of the private funding system.
Disclosure is intended to discourage potentially corrupting contribu-
tions and to enable voters to take action at the polling booth against candi-
dates who accept such contributions. 13 Disclosure, however, does nothing
to ensure adequate funding for candidates or to promote electoral competi-
tion. Nor is there much evidence that disclosure actually reduces large con-
tributions.
Contribution limits more directly attack the danger of corruption by
capping donations at amounts arguably incapable of affecting officeholder
decision making, as well as by directly prohibiting contributions from cer-
tain sources that are seen as particularly problematic. Contribution limits
may also indirectly address the problem of unequal influence over elections
by restricting the ability of the wealthy to devote their resources to aiding
candidates. But, like disclosure, contribution limits do nothing to help can-
didates obtain necessary funding or to promote competition.
14
Public funding is the only reform technique that actually seeks to aid
candidates and promote competition. It can increase candidates' resources,
help challengers, reduce fundraising burdens, and curb the advantage of
wealthy self-funded candidates. By alleviating candidates' dependence on
private contributions, public funding also attacks the danger of corrup-
tion. 5 Similarly, by reducing the significance of a small number of large
donors, public funding promotes voter equality.
Public funding is the least developed component of campaign finance
regulation. In federal elections, public funding is available only for presi-
dential candidates. This program has been underfunded since its inception
and is increasingly incapable of adequately financing presidential cam-
paigns. 6 As a result, candidates may be discouraged from participating in
the program, and even candidates who accept public funding continue to
pursue private funds for activities that can benefit their campaigns. There
13. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67.
14. Contribution limits can have distressing side effects. They promote evasion, as both
candidates and donors look for opportunities for donors to give to organizations (like state political
parties or national party soft-money accounts) or activities (like independent spending and issue
advocacy) that are nominally separate from a candidate's campaign but that can benefit that campaign.
In an era of high and rapidly rising campaign costs, contribution limits force candidates to devote
considerable time and effort to fundraising. The tension between accelerating-and constitutionally
uncontrollable-expenditures and statutorily limited contributions provides an opportunity for
individuals and intermediary organizations skilled at raising funds to assume an influential role in the
system. The combination of rising expenditures and limited contributions has also benefited wealthy
self-funded candidates, as the Supreme Court has held that their expenditures of personal resources for
their own campaigns cannot be treated as contributions subject to limitation. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at
51-54.
15. See id. at 91.
16. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563,
586 (1999) (hereinafter Public Funding).
2003]
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has never been a public-funding program for congressional elections. A
number of states and cities" have adopted public-funding programs for
some candidates, but most jurisdictions rely on disclosure and contribution
limits exclusively. Many of the state public-funding programs are also un-
derfunded, reflecting perhaps a misguided desire to reduce not just the role
of private money in politics but the amount of money in elections gener-
ally.
BCRA follows the basic structure of federal campaign finance law by
focusing largely on disclosure and limits on private money while ignoring
the public funding option. Indeed, recognizing that limitations on soft
money, unaccompanied by public funding, may sharply reduce the avail-
ability of money for campaigns, BCRA raises FECA's limits on hard
money.' 8 BCRA also raises the contribution limits that apply to donations
to candidates facing self-funded opponents who contribute large sums to
their own campaigns. 9 The increase in limitations on hard money will
make it somewhat easier for candidates to raise money but will do little to
address the financial imbalance that favors incumbents over challengers.
At best, BCRA's combination of increases in hard money and restric-
tions on soft money will limit some of the corrupting effects of the private
money system without addressing the need for adequate funding. More
negative scenarios suggest that the increase in the hard-money limit will
erode the presidential public-funding system"0 while the restrictions on soft
17. For a recent assessment of public financing laws in thirteen cities and counties (including
New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco), see CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES,
PUBLIC FINANCING LAWS IN LOCAL JURISDICTIONS, Sept. 25, 2002, http://www.cgs.org.
18. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(amending FECA § 315 (a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)); see also id at § 102 (increasing limits on
contributions to state political party committees).
19. ld. at § 304.
20. BCRA could harm the presidential public-funding program because it increases considerably
the limits on hard-money donations without increasing the public grants to candidates. Currently, in
presidential primaries, hard-money contributions to candidates who participate in the funding program
receive a dollar-for-dollar public match, up to $250 per contribution, subject to a statutory ceiling on
the total public payment per candidate. 26 U.S.C. § 9034 (2002). BCRA doubles the permissible private
donation to a presidential primary candidate from $ 1,000 to $2,000, but it does not lift the $250 limit on
the portion of a private donation that is eligible for a public match, nor does it increase the public-
matching ratio or the spending ceiling for primary elections. Similarly, BCRA does not increase the
size of the public grant to candidates in the presidential general election. As a result, private funding is
now a more attractive alternative to the public grant than it was before BCRA. In 1999-2000, George
W. Bush became the first major party contender since the public funding law was enacted in 1974 to
participate successfully in the presidential primaries without public funding. Having raised $100
million in hard-money donations at a time when he was not yet the incumbent and the hard-money
contribution limit was just $1,000, President Bush should easily be able to double that in 2004 to $200
million running as the incumbent with a $2,000 limit. That is more than double the maximum amount
of public money likely to be available to any Democratic candidate contesting both the primary and
general elections in 2004. The growing gap between the contribution limit and public funding may also
drive many of the leading Democratic contenders out of the public-funding system. See Thomas B.
Edsall, Privatized Primaries? Some Leading Democrats May Eschew Public Funding in '04, WASH.
POST, July 10, 2002, at A6.
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money will make it more difficult for candidates to raise funds or will
breed new evasive tactics that undermine BCRA-or both-without ad-
dressing the need for adequate funding.
BCRA, thus, is only a partial reform. BCRA's enactment, however,
may indicate that campaign finance reform enjoys a new degree of political
salience. In their new book, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for
Campaign Finance,2 Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, both of
Yale Law School, seek to take advantage of this opening for reform with a
comprehensive and creative approach for financing federal election cam-
paigns. Their proposal has two principal components.
First, sharply departing from the past century of federal campaign fi-
nance law and, especially, the last thirty years under FECA, they reject
mandatory disclosure of the sources and amounts of campaign contribu-
tions. Instead, Ackerman and Ayres promote a regime of anonymous dona-
tions in which donors contribute through a blind trust.22 Donors would still
channel their funds to particular candidates, parties, and political commit-
tees, but, under the provisions outlined by Ackerman and Ayres, there
would be no way for a donee to be certain that a particular donor had made
a large contribution to her. As a result, Ackerman and Ayres contend that
donors would lose the ability to use their contributions to leverage access
to elected officials or to obtain undue influence over government decisions.
Contributions made for the purpose of obtaining access to officeholders
would likely decline, and the influence of large donors over elections, as
well as over the political process, would likely diminish.
Second, Ackerman and Ayres propose that most of the funding for
federal elections come from public grants provided in the form of vouchers
given to registered voters who could transfer the vouchers to candidates,
parties, and political organizations participating in federal elections. 3
Ackerman and Ayres have emphasized the voucher aspect of their public-
funding program (in contrast to all existing public-funding programs,
which consist of public grants directly to qualifying candidates or parties).
At least as important is their requirement that roughly two-thirds of all
campaign money, with current levels of campaign spending treated as a
baseline, consist of public funds.24 Again, this proposal differs from most
other public-funding programs in assuring that public funding is both ade-
quate for campaign needs and the dominant source of campaign money.
21. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
22. See id at 25-44, 93-110. The anonymous-donation component of their proposal grows out of
an earlier plan presented by Professor Ayres and a coauthor, Jeremy Bulow. See generally Ian Ayres &
Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political
Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998).
23. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2 1, at 12-24, 66-92.
24. Id. at 89-90.
20031
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Yet, Ackerman and Ayres also insist on the importance of some continued
role for private funding."
As the title of their book suggests, Ackerman and Ayres link their
campaign finance system to the rules governing voting.2 6 Their anony-
mous-contribution proposal intentionally echoes the role of the secret bal-
lot in preventing vote buying and election day corruption. Their
requirement that every voter be given an equal voucher of $50 to be used
solely to finance federal election campaigns draws on the constitutional
norms of near-universal suffrage and one person, one vote. Ackerman and
Ayres also stress how much their program constitutes a dramatic departure
from the older, outmoded regulatory approach marked by "rigid command
and control"2 and bureaucratic "centralized campaign subsidies."28 They
emphasize the decentralized, democratic nature of their program, with "the
anonymous donation booth" taking the place of government-mandated con-
tribution restrictions and vouchers eliminating the role of bureaucrats in
determining which candidates get public funding and how much they get.
In their view, the proposal represents not just some new reform program
but a new paradigm for thinking about campaign finance regulation.29
This Review Essay considers the central elements of Ackerman and
Ayres's reform program and their claim that their package constitutes a
new paradigm. Part I will address the proposal for anonymous donations.
The authors make a powerful case that anonymity is more likely than dis-
closure to curb the corrupting effects of special-interest donations. But an
anonymity system depends upon secrecy being maintained, and it is not
clear the authors have demonstrated that it will be. Moreover, secrecy will
not discourage large contributions motivated by ideological support for the
donee rather than the desire to win access to a grateful recipient. Under the
Ackerman and Ayres plan, such gifts would continue unchecked. Indeed,
they will loom larger than they do today, yet voters would be in the dark
about the sources and amounts of such gifts.
Part II considers the public funding proposal-what Ackerman and
Ayres call "Patriot money." Some public-funding program is essential for a
campaign finance reform worthy of the name, but the most heralded com-
ponent of the Ackerman and Ayres plan is not public funding per se but a
voucher system under which voters transmit public funds to candidates.
Vouchers provide an appealing resolution of two of the central issues
inherent in any campaign finance system: determining which candidates
receive public funds and how much the funded candidates receive.
25. Id. at 57-63.
26. Id. at 4-6.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Id. at 3.
[Vol. 91:643
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However, vouchers will be less effective than grants to qualifying candi-
dates in accomplishing two of the central purposes of public fund-
ing: promoting competitive elections and reducing the burdens of
fundraising. Despite the shortcomings of the voucher concept, the central
features of the Ackerman and Ayres proposal ought to inform other public
funding plans, particularly its provisions for a mix of public and private
funds, a high level of funding, and a statutory mechanism assuring that
public funds dominate private contributions.
Part III considers Ackerman and Ayres's claim that their proposal
constitutes a "new paradigm for campaign finance." The Ackerman and
Ayres program is, indeed, admirably creative, thoughtful, and well devel-
oped,3" but their rhetoric is overblown. They rely considerably on just the
kind of outmoded "command and control regulation" they dismiss.31 Not-
withstanding their denunciations of a centralized bureaucracy, they also
give enormous discretion to the FEC to define key regulatory measures and
modify central aspects of the Patriot program.
32
Overstated rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, the Ackerman
and Ayres proposal is an important one, effectively demonstrating the prac-
tical possibilities for significant reform under existing constitutional con-
straints. The two central elements in their structure-anonymous
contributions and vouchers-are innovative and potentially significant for
future debates over campaign finance. They merit the considerable atten-
tion they surely will receive.
I
FROM DISCLOSURE TO ANONYMITY
A. Disclosure
Mandatory disclosure of the sources and amounts of campaign contri-
butions and expenditures has long been a cornerstone of federal campaign
finance law. One of the very first federal campaign finance measures, the
Publicity of Political Contributions Act of 1910, required the disclosure of
campaign receipts and expenditures in House of Representatives elec-
tions.33 Disclosure was extended in 1911 to include prenomination activi-
ties34 and was carried forward by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925. 3" Due to drafting defects and the lack of enforcement, these measures
30. One of the strong points of their book is a fully worked-out model statute prepared with the
assistance of Yale doctoral student Danton Berub6. See id. at 181-221.
31. See id. at 4.
32. Id. at 86-90 (discussing the FEC's authorization to change the value of Patriot vouchers).
33. Publicity of Political Contributions Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 822 (1910).
34. 37 Stat. 25-26 (August 19, 1911).
35. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070, 1072-73 (1925). The 1925 Act
strengthened disclosure by requiring all political committees active in two or more states to file
quarterly financial reports listing contributions of $100 or more with the Clerk of the House (for House
2003]
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had little real effect other than signifying the symbolic importance of dis-
closure.36 FECA finally made disclosure meaningful by spelling out com-
prehensive and precise requirements and by creating a mechanism for
enforcement.37 Indeed, the last three decades have witnessed extensive dis-
closure concerning the sources and amounts of funds contributed to candi-
dates, political parties, and PACs, and by PACs and parties to candidates.
The case for disclosure consists of two mutually reinforcing elements.
First, as the Supreme Court observed in Buckley v. Valeo, "disclosure
requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity. This exposure may discourage those who would use money for
improper purposes either before or after the election."38 In other words, on
the theory that "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,"39 disclosure
may prevent corrupt contributions. Second, disclosure provides voters with
information about the identity of a candidate's financial supporters and the
intensity of their support. As a result, the Court observed that disclosure
allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more
precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels
and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial
support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is
most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future
performance in office."
The two justifications converge in the argument that the prospect of voter
awareness of a contribution may make the recipient less likely to provide a
donor with favors.
The case for disclosure is almost certainly overstated.4 Although it is
inherently difficult to measure the contributions not made due to disclosure
laws, the significant and rapidly growing number of large contributions by
races), or the Secretary of the Senate (for Senate races), even in nonelection years. See ROBERT E.
MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
24-25 (1988).
36. See, e.g., DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 86-87 (1975).
37. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 433, 434, 437c, 437d, 437g, 438 (2002) (detailing registration and reporting
requirements for political committees, and creating and empowering the FEC to enforce those reporting
requirements).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,67 (1976).
39. Id. (quoting and citing Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (National Home
Library Foundation ed., 1933)).
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
41. A particular problem with the theory that disclosure prevents corruption arises when, like
FECA, campaign finance law imposes both disclosure requirements and contribution limits.
Contribution limits are intended to prevent the large contributions that raise the potential for corruption.
But if a contribution amount falls under the limit, then presumably the jurisdiction has concluded it
does not present the danger of corruption. How, then, does the corruption-prevention concern (as
opposed to the voter-information concern)justify its prevention?
[Vol. 91:643
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individuals and interest groups suggest that disclosure laws have not done
much to discourage large donations. In 1996, for example, two-thirds of the
value of the individual contributions given to candidates for the House of
Representatives came from large donations, defined as those between $200
and $1,000. Similarly, 60% of the value of individual donations to incum-
bent Senate candidates; 65% of the value of individual donations to chal-
lengers; and 75% of the value of individual donations to open seat
candidates came from large donations. 2 After -large individual donors, the
principal participants in congressional campaign finance are PACs. The
total number of PACs exploded more than sevenfold after FECA required
the disclosure of PAC contributions. Moreover, the relatively small number
of PACs that make very large contributions account for most PAC giving.43
The rapid growth of soft money during the 1990s was marked by a sharp
rise in very large donations, including gifts in excess of $100,000, even
though due to FEC regulations these contributions were subject to disclo-
sure. Thus, little evidence shows that disclosure has constrained the num-
ber or rate of growth of large contributions.
The effect of disclosure on voter information or voter behavior is also
unclear. According to Dean Kathleen M. Sullivan, the beauty of disclosure
is that it "places the question of undue influence or preferential access in
the hands of the voters, who, aided by the institutional press, can follow the
money and hold representatives accountable for any trails they don't
like."44 But does it? Full disclosure of campaign contributions produces
mountains of political finance information that must be exhaustively mined
and analyzed to reveal significant patterns of giving and spending. The ef-
fectiveness of disclosure relies, to a considerable extent, on the media's
willingness to examine the available information and present it to the pub-
lic in a useful form before the election. Although in the aftermath of politi-
cal or financial scandals the media often turn to campaign contribution
reports to "follow the money" and see whether connections exist between
campaign donations and legislative action (or inaction), the media gener-
ally gives less attention to campaign finance reports during the pre-election
period. As one recent study of state-level campaign laws found, in most
states
very few newspapers allocated even one reporter's time to
analyzing campaign finance documents. Newspapers that once
42. Comm'n on Campaign Fin. Reform, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 7,
at 61.
43. See id. at 64-65.
44. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 326;
accord.Samuel Issacharoff& Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1737 (1999) (the effect of disclosure is "to shift vigilance over campaign contributions
away from regulatory bodies ... [to] the normal workings of the political process by competing
candidates or parties and by the press").
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made the financial commitment are now cutting back. From a
journalistic perspective, absent a scandal, the story seems complex
and repetitive-less of a news story. As a result, newspapers are
giving less space to reporting disclosed information at a time when
the increasing volume and complexity of the reports would require
more of an effort, not less, if the public is to get the relevant
information in time for an election decision.45
And this relatively skeptical study focused on newspapers. Voters get most
of their information from television. At a time when broadcasters have
greatly reduced their coverage of electoral politics, it is doubtful that much
campaign finance information actually reaches the public.
Nor will opposition candidates necessarily pick up the slack:
When competing candidates are well funded, both are likely to
count big givers and interest groups among their contributors;
neither then has an interest in raising the political finance issue. If
one candidate is well funded and the other is not, the impoverished
candidate simply does not have the resources to discover and
publicize the amounts and sources of his opponent's funds.46
Even if the press or opposition parties analyze and disseminate contri-
bution data in a timely manner, it will often be difficult for voters to use
that information. Many wealthy individuals, corporations, trade associa-
tions, and interest groups give to more than one candidate competing in the
same race, and to the national and congressional campaign committees of
both major political parties. Voters troubled by those donations can do lit-
tle to punish the candidates or political parties that receive donations from
particular sources if both major party opponents benefit from money from
those sources.
Moreover, a voter can cast only one vote, and her concerns about
sources of campaign funds may be offset by the desire to vote for the can-
didate who is closer to the voter on other issues." Voters usually cast their
ballots based on multiple, varied concerns other than the sburces of cam-
paign funding-the records and characters of the candidates, their policies
concerning the economy, taxation, national security, and other issues. It is
doubtful that campaign contributions are at the top, or even in the middle,
of this list. The vote may be too blunt an instrument to be an effective
means for voters to discourage contributions from sources they view as
undesirable.
To be sure, some voters may be influenced by disclosure in some
elections, such as when different groups of donors give to different candi-
dates so that the contribution information actually illuminates the
45. MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAiS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 46 (1998).
46. ADAMANY & AGREE, supra note 36, at 113-14.
47. See id. at H 4.
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differences among the contenders. But it is doubtful that disclosure does
much to reduce the role of special-interest money or to enable voters to
discourage special-interest donations.
Disclosure is also in some tension with the value of political privacy.48
The combination of reporting and disclosure requirements and modem in-
formation technology means that the contribution practices of millions of
Americans-the amounts and recipients of the donations as well as a few
basic facts about the donors-are open to easy inspection by the donors'
neighbors, relatives, coworkers, friends, and enemies.49 The law broadcasts
information about the nature and intensity of a donor's beliefs, as well as
some information about the donor's capacity and propensity to give, to
"anyone who has a modem" and is interested in finding out.5" Although the
Supreme Court has held that the reporting and disclosure requirements are
constitutional5' and justified by the aforementioned interests in preventing
corruption and informing voters, it is still arguably a significant invasion of
the financial and political privacy of donors. If donors were fully aware of
the extent to which contribution information is subject to wide dissemina-
tion, some, "motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by con-
cem about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of
one's privacy as possible,"52 might well be discouraged from making con-
tributions.
Disclosure is unlikely to deter large donors who have significant in-
terests in government decision making and view campaign contributions as
a cost of doing business. But disclosure could chill contributions by those
citizens who give to candidates or organizations who, they believe, will
advance views they support, but who do not want their views or affiliations
broadcast over the Internet to the rest of the world. Although the potential
to chill participation by ordinary citizens could perhaps be addressed by
raising the disclosure threshold, disclosure inherently involves some viola-
tion of political privacy. 3
48. I am indebted to William McGeveran, of the NYU Law School Class of 2002, for helping me
to better appreciate the conflict between mandatory disclosure and the value of political privacy. See
William A. McGeveran, The Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
(forthcoming October 2003).
49. See Fred Bernstein, An Online Peek at Your Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A35.
50. Id.
51. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976).
52. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
53. The Supreme Court in Buckley acknowledged that minor parties with more precarious
financial bases may be vulnerable to the chilling effect of the disclosure of the identity of donors, and
that the government interest in such disclosure is diminished when the candidate or party has little
chance of winning the election. The Court declined to create a blanket exception for minor parties but
indicated it would exempt a party from the disclosure requirement on a showing that disclosure might
subject the party's donors to harassment. 424 U.S. at 68-72. In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982), the Court found that the Socialist Workers Party, which
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Nevertheless, despite these problems, disclosure remains central to
campaign finance regulation. As Professor and FEC Commissioner
Bradley A. Smith, a leading critic of campaign finance reform, has noted,
"[d]isclosure has proven to be a popular remedy even with those generally
skeptical of campaign finance regulation."54  Indeed, skeptics like
Commissioner Smith, Dean Sullivan, and Justices Scalia and Thomas
would limit campaign finance regulation to disclosure simpliciter." Re-
formers would require much more regulation but still treat disclosure as
"the basic foundation on which all other regulation must rest."56 Indeed, an
important strand in BCRA is the extension of FECA to cover some expen-
ditures currently exempt from disclosure as issue advocacy. 7 Ackerman
and Ayres, however, would abandon this fundamental component of cam-
paign finance law and replace it with its diametrical opposite-anonymity.
Their proposal requires us to consider whether anonymity can do a better
job than disclosure in preventing the harmful consequences of large contri-
butions and whether the gains in reducing the "corrupting" effects of big
contributions outweigh the loss in voter information that would result from
ending disclosure.
B. The Anonymous Donation Booth
Ackerman and Ayres propose that all contributions to candidates and
political organizations-defined to include political parties and organiza-
tions that engage in independent campaigns concerning candidates-be
made through a blind trust controlled by the FEC. 8 All contributions
would be anonymous. The FEC would be required to keep confidential the
identities of the donors, the identities of the recipients of particular dona-
tions, and the amounts particular donors give to particular recipients. Con-
tributors could waive this anonymity and request that the FEC disclose the
fact and amount of their donations to identified recipients. But, even then,
the FEC would be barred from saying anything about the size of any con-
tribution in excess of $200 other than reporting that the contribution was
"$200+. " 59
Donors themselves would not be barred from disclosing their contri-
butions. Donors could voluntarily report to candidates, committees, or the
had been harassed by the government in the past, was constitutionally entitled to an exemption from a
state disclosure requirement.
54. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 220
(2001).
55. See id.; Sullivan, supra note 44, at 326 (disclosure is the "most salutary" aspect of FECA);
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428-30 (2000) (Thomas, J. & Scalia, J,,
dissenting).
56. MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 45, at 30.
57. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
58. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 25-44, 93-110, 199-203.
59. Id. at 201-02.
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world, the fact, size, and designated beneficiaries of their campaign
contributions. However, Ackerman and Ayres would require that all con-
tributions remain revocable within five days after delivery to the blind
trust. Ackerman and Ayres contend that as a result of the five-day revoca-
tion period, a donor could never prove to a candidate, party, or PAC that
she had not revoked the portion of the contribution in excess of $200. As a
result, the putative recipient could never be certain that the donor had actu-
ally made a donation--or a donation of the particular (large) size claimed.
Relying on what they call the "mimicry principle"6 (and what other people
might call more simply "lying"), they assume that both donors of $201 and
donors of $10,000 can claim to have made $10,000 contributions. Both can
flourish $10,000 checks before the designated recipients. But some donors
will subsequently revoke their $10,000 checks and replace them with $201
checks, and the FEC will report the $10,000 donations and the $201 dona-
tions the same way-as $200+. In this "'noisy' environment, full of poten-
tially misleading signals,"'" a candidate or party could never be sure
whether the putative donor had actually made the large contribution he
claims to have made. Candidates and parties, thus, would be less inclined
to respond to their donors since they would be uncertain whether the do-
nors really were significant supporters. In turn, those donors who give pri-
marily to win favors from and gain access to officeholders would stop
giving, or give less, since their donations would no longer pay off as they
had before. Ultimately, the candidate-contributor relationship would erode,
and the role of special-interest money in financing federal election cam-
paigns would dry up.
Ackerman and Ayres flesh out their proposal with additional measures
designed to maintain anonymity. One concern is that a donor who makes a
very large contribution could pierce the veil of anonymity since a sudden
increase in the candidate's blind trust similar in size to the donation would
tend to validate the contribution claim. They deal with this possibility in
two ways. First, they would deploy a "secrecy algorithm" when a candidate
receives a small number of very large gifts. The algorithm would serve to
hold back some of the money for a time and permit distribution to the can-
didate over the next several weeks.62 Second, recognizing that the largest
contributions would frustrate even the secrecy algorithm, they would place
a ceiling on how much a donor can give to a particular candidate both in
any two-week period and over the course of a campaign.63
The Ackerman and Ayres plan constitutes a bold departure from cam-
paign finance law's traditional commitment to disclosure. It prompts
60. Id. at 101.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 104-08.
63. Id. at 113-18.
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several questions. First, can the secrecy essential for the plan to work be
maintained? Second, will anonymity be more successful than disclosure in
undermining the quid pro quo relationship that can result from large cam-
paign contributions? Third, can the system be circumvented by other meth-
ods of providing financial support to candidates? Finally, are the benefits
of secrecy justified by the loss in public information concerning the identi-
ties and intensity of support of the financial backers of candidates, major
parties, and PACs?
1. Can anonymity be maintained?
Whether anonymity will work depends on the integrity of the blind
trust staff who receive and process campaign contributions. Blind trust
staff sympathetic to one candidate might try to discredit that candidate's
opponent by leaking to the press the details concerning a contribution from
an embarrassing source. Even if the staffer could be punished for the unau-
thorized disclosure, media reports concerning otherwise anonymous cam-
paign contributions are probably constitutionally protected.64 Alternatively,
a staffer allied with a particular donor might surreptitiously convey the fact
and size of the donation to the recipient. Leaving aside questions of staff
partisanship or bias, there is, as Ackerman and Ayres acknowledge, "the
danger of sheer corruption-donors and politicians bribing trust officials to
leak the data they need to grease the wheels of the quid pro quo."6
To reduce the temptation to take graft, Ackerman and Ayres would
provide "premium salaries"66 for blind trust staff and impose a "ten-year
ban on employment by any big donor or candidate."67 More weakly, to
control against partisan staff behavior, they would mandate
"antifraternization regulations that bar blind trust officials from associating
with candidates or their representatives outside the office."68 Ultimately,
though, they acknowledge that it will be up to the leaders of the FEC "to
foster a spirit of genuine independence for their watchdog agency-a spirit
that will inspire officials to take pride in a job well done."69 This is a tall
order for the FEC-one of the most criticized federal agencies; 70 another
part of the Ackennan and Ayres program significantly revamps the FEC.7'
64. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
65. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 99; cf Kenneth R. Mayer, Answering Ayres,
REGULATION, Winter 2001, at 24, 28 ("The possibility of private traffic in contribution data leads to all
manner of pathologies. Candidates could seek damaging information about their opponents in the hope
of exposing contributions from out-of-favor interests or individuals.").
66. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 99.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 100.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., PROJECT FEC, supra note 6. The FEC has been criticized as ineffective and riven by
partisanship. See id. at 7-18. The FEC consists of six members, appointed by the president with the
advice and consent of the Senate, who serve for six-year terms. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1), (2)(A) (2002).
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It is unclear whether the combination of high salaries, anti-revolving
door and antifraternization rules, and a reconstituted FEC could assure the
maintenance of anonymity. As Professor Ayres has acknowledged, "I am
under no illusion that this (or any other) system of anonymity would be
completely successful in keeping candidates uninformed."72 Of course, no
regulatory system is perfect, and some violations of the rules are inevitable.
The question is whether the system works in most cases and whether the
public has confidence that the anonymity rules are generally being fol-
lowed.
The empirical evidence concerning the integrity of anonymous contri-
bution systems is uncertain. As Professor Ayres and coauthor Jeremy
Bulow noted in an earlier article, a number of states mandate that judicial
candidates be kept uninformed about donations to their campaigns.73 Ayres
and Bulow found that in at least some states these rules have effectively
kept judges in the dark about the identity of their financial backers, al-
though they note that critics have called the effectiveness of these require-
ments into question.74
In the United Kingdom, the Committee on Standards in Public Life
("Committee")" recently came out in favor of the disclosure of campaign
No more than three commissioners may be affiliated with any one political party. See id. at §
437c(a)(1). In practice, this has meant that the FEC is composed of three Democrats and three
Republicans. The president does not appoint a chair; rather, the position rotates annually among the
members. Moreover, despite the provision for presidential appointment, in practice the commissioners
are picked by congressional party leaders. They are usually "chosen on the basis of their political
allegiances rather than their qualifications and commitment to effective administration and enforcement
of the law." PROJECT FEC, supra note 6, at 15. With six commissioners, divided three-to-three along
partisan lines, and four votes necessary to take action, the FEC has been deadlocked in many politically
charged cases. See id. at 53-57. In other cases, the members from both parties may act together to block
proceedings hostile to the interests of the parties. See id. at 11-13. The FEC is also hobbled by a
cumbersome, multistep enforcement process that values conciliation over vigorous action to prevent
and penalize violations of the law, a lack of resources, and congressional retaliation when the agency
actually seeks to carry out its mandate and vigorously enforce the campaign finance laws. See id. at 13-
15, 19-23, 71-78.
71. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 128-39. Ackerman and Ayres would replace the six-
member politicized FEC with a five-member body composed solely of retired federal judges, each
serving for one, nonrenewable ten-year tenn. See id. at 129-30. According to the authors, this will
create a body that is both nonpartisan and decisive. See id. at 130. Their proposal would also simplify
the ability of the agency to bring enforcement actions and would protect the agency's budget by
insulating it from annual congressional review. See id. at 133, 135.
72. lan Ayres, Disclosure Versus Anonymity in Campaign Finance, in NoMos XLII, DESIGNING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 19, 35 (lan Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
73. Ayres & Bulow, supra note 22, at 871-75.
74. Id. at 873-74 n.138 (citing sources claiming that anonymity "doesn't work" and "is... nearly
impossible to enforce."); Mayer, supra note 65, at 28 (noting "[t]he dismal track record of restrictions
on the dissemination of political infonnation").
75. The Committee on Standards in Public Life is a standing committee of Parliament created by
then-Prime Minister John Major in 1994 to "examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all
holders of public office, including arrangements relating to financial and commercial activities."
Following Labour's election victory in 1997, the Committee's terms of reference were extended to
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contributions to political parties, explicitly rejecting blind trusts as an al-
ternative, noting that "there must be considerable doubt whether they
ensure anonymity. 7 6 The Committee suggested that the problem was not
so much the integrity of blind trust administrators, but the danger that a
"cynical" public will not believe in the effectiveness of the trust and will
instead "conclude that a donor can easily let it be known to the beneficiary
that he or she has made a substantial contribution." 7 Given a large donor's
incentive to inform the candidate about the full size of his contribution, the
public may doubt that anonymity can be maintained. Public confidence in
the effectiveness of the regulatory regime is particularly critical in the
campaign finance setting, where the protection of public belief in the le-
gitimacy of the electoral process has long been a crucial factor in the ap-
praisal of election laws. Indeed, getting the public to believe in the
integrity of the anonymity system may be more difficult than actually
maintaining anonymity.
2. Will anonymity alleviate the potentially corrupting effects of large
contributions?
As one pair of critics has noted, the Ackerman and Ayres proposal
relies not simply on anonymity but on a "culture of widespread mistrust,"7
in which donors lie about their contributions, and candidates are encour-
aged to disbelieve the claims of donors. But how many donors actually will
lie about their donations, go through the trouble of writing a $10,000
check, show it to the candidate, send it to the blind trust, and then revoke
the donation and replace it with one for $201?
Surely the personal friends, partisan allies, or ideological backers of
the candidate will have little interest in these tricks. These donors genu-
inely and strongly want the candidate to win. Other donors may have
worked and supported the candidate in the past and look forward to doing
so in the future. Given their regular contacts with the candidate, they are
more likely to be honest and give what they say they are going to give.
Many donors are honorable individuals and will do exactly what they say
they will do.
But certainly some donors may be dishonest about the size of their
contributions. Donors who regularly do business with the government or
engage in activities subject to extensive government oversight give not out
of affection or support for the candidate, but to gain access to the
include "issues in relation to the funding of political parties." See FIFTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
VOLUME I: REPORT 15-16(1998).
76. Id. at § 4.72, 61-62.
77. Id. at 62.
78. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Paying for Politics, in NoMos XLII, supra note 72, at 55,
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Representative or Senator who sits on the committee with jurisdiction over
the donor's enterprise. They do not particularly care whether the donee
wins or loses so long as he is willing to meet the donor with respect to a
legislative or regulatory matter affecting the donor's business.
Although many reformers and the general public regard campaign
contributions as a device for donors to "bribe" officeholders, to many do-
nors the system resembles "extortion" with officeholders pressuring them
to make contributions as the price of access. These unwilling and resentful
contributors may very well take advantage of the opportunity Ackerman
and Ayres give them to subvert officeholder pressures by lying about the
size of their contributions. Even if only a relative handful lie, so long as
candidates are aware of the possibility that some of their donors may be
lying, the seeds of mistrust are planted, and candidates may grow to dis-
trust their donors (or at least their "access" donors) more generally.
Ackerman and Ayres count on this outcome to shatter the quid pro quo re-
lationships that grow out of access contributions.
Paradoxically, Ackerman and Ayres undermine the very "culture of
widespread mistrust" necessary for their program to work by requiring that
ten years after each election the FEC release to the public a complete con-
tributions list indicating the donor, amount, and recipient of each contribu-
tion. This enables donors to verify that their gifts were, in fact, credited to
the intended recipient.79 In the "culture of widespread mistrust" on which
they rely, it would be as reasonable for donors to mistrust the FEC staff as
it is for candidates to mistrust donors. However, if donors look to the audits
to check up on the blind trust staff, then presumably politicians, particu-
larly politically powerful incumbents, will look to the audits to check on
their donors' claims. Although Ackerman and Ayres contend that "after ten
years, the data will be too stale for donors and politicians to use as a basis
for future-oriented dealings,"8 the prospect of ten-year audits may have a
devastating effect on the willingness of donors-particularly the ongoing
political players most likely to take advantage of the anonymity scheme-
to lie about their donations. As Professor Kenneth Mayer contends, "When
a false claim becomes known, the people who made it would see their
credibility drop to zero in all future interactions. Nobody with long-term
stakes in the political process would be willing to risk that.""1
Ackerman and Ayres need some other mechanism that assures donors
that their contributions are spent as they intend and keeps politicians in the
dark about the size of the donations they receive.
79. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 99, 202.
80. Id. at 99.
81. Mayer, supra note 65, at 27.
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3. Can the blind trust be circumvented?
Assuming the disincentive to lying created by the ten-year audit can
be addressed and anonymity maintained, will donors be able to outflank
the secret donation booth and use their campaign funds to establish rela-
tionships with candidates? The most plausible technique is the independent
expenditure. Instead of contributing money to a candidate, a would-be do-
nor could spend money directly on communications to the voters that sing
the candidate's praises or attack his opponent. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court determined that in "the absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent,"82 an inde-
pendent expenditure does not present the same quid pro quo danger as a
contribution to the candidate and, thus, cannot be restricted.83 Although the
Court may well have underestimated the ability of individuals and interest
groups to use independent expenditures to win a candidate's gratitude, the
prohibition on independent expenditure limits remains a part of constitu-
tional doctrine, and an independent expenditure provides an important al-
ternative to the contribution for aiding a candidate.
Ackerman and Ayres address independent expenditures by requiring
that contributions to organizations that make independent expenditures also
be made through the blind trust so that candidates would not know the
identities of donors actually paying for the independent expenditures. This
is, at best, a partial control on the independent expenditure end-run. First,
in many situations the donors seek a benefit not for themselves individually
but for their interest group. Individuals who give to the car dealers' PAC,
the beer distributors' PAC, the trial lawyers' PAC, and so on, are not look-
ing for an individual reward but for recognition of their interest group's
role in aiding the candidate. Using the blind trust to mask group members'
identities and individual donation amounts does nothing to hide the inde-
pendent spending program. If such a group engages in independent spend-
ing, the benefited candidate can easily be made aware of just how much the
group spends. Second, wealthy individuals looking for personal recogni-
tion by the candidate do not need to make contributions to a group. They
can take out ads directly, so their spending is also outside the blind trust's
cloak of anonymity.
Still, independent expenditures may not pose a serious risk to the
goals of the anonymity regime. The Ackennan and Ayres proposal primar-
ily targets individuals and groups who buy access with donations.84 Inde-
pendent expenditures are inconsistent with the measured, pay-to-play
82. 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
83. Id. Individuals and organizations that engage in independent spending, however, can be
required to disclose sources and amounts of donations they receive and the expenditures they make
above a threshold level.
84. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 171-73.
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support that their contributions represent. As previously noted, these do-
nors often give to both candidates in a contested race and, more generally,
give to both major political parties. But an independent expenditure clearly
supports one candidate or opposes another. The spender directly seeks to
influence voter decision making. It would be highly implausible for a do-
nor to make independent expenditures advocating the election of both can-
didates in a race or to take out ads backing both Democrats and
Republicans. In other words, even though the independent expenditure
does not involve the contribution of money to a candidate, it is actually a
more public and emphatic form of support for that candidate than a
contribution.
Ideological interests, partisan groups, and individuals strongly com-
mitted for or against a particular candidate, interest, or party make inde-
pendent expenditures and would probably do so under the anonymity
regime. But these groups are also likely to make large contributions
through the blind trust. They would use the independent expenditure not to
avoid the anonymity aspect of the blind trust but to circumvent the dollar
limits on contributions, much as such groups currently use independent
expenditures and issue advocacy to avoid contribution limits under
FECA's disclosure regime. By contrast, inside-the-Beltway players who
give as part of their legislative lobbying are unlikely to want to come out
so dramatically on one side, and, thus, alienate the opposing candidate or
members of that candidate's party. They are unlikely to tum to independent
expenditures in an anonymity regime.
4. Are the costs ofshifting from disclosure to anonymity justified by the
gains?
Assuming that anonymity and public confidence in anonymity can be
maintained, that the audit problem can be solved without public disclosure,
and that donors will not turn to independent expenditures to replace the
contributions they are discouraged from making-in other words, that ano-
nymity works-what are anonymity's costs, and are they worth the gains?
The principal cost of anonymity is the loss of information both for
voters during an election and for the general public between elections. Un-
der the Ackerman and Ayres plan, neither voters in the pre-election period,
nor the public in the years immediately after the election, will know any-
thing about the identities or intensity of support of the financial backers of
candidates and officeholders. The only information will come out ten years
later-far too late to affect most current electoral decisions. The loss of
information concerning "access" contributors is not likely to be a problem.
The voters would lose information about the identity of a candidate's back-
ers, but so would the candidates. As a result, either those contributions will
dry up since such donors will no longer be able to leverage their
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contributions into access, or, even if they continue to make donations, poli-
ticians' inability to verify donation amounts will eliminate the danger of
quid pro quo donations. Voters would have no need to use contribution
information to police the integrity of elected officials because the threat to
public integrity would disappear.
However, as previously noted, some contributions are made not to
influence the candidate-as-officeholder but to influence the outcome of an
election. These donors give not to gain postelection access but because,
due to any number of ideological, partisan, ethnic, economic, or cultural
concerns, they want one candidate or party to win. They are unlikely to be
discouraged by anonymity. Indeed, the anonymity regime may encourage
politically controversial groups to give more. Anonymity, however, would
deny voters information concerning which ideological groups are backing
particular candidates and how intensely they are doing so. Although in
some cases disclosure would not provide much additional information be-
yond the fact of support-endorsements might have made that clear-
disclosure would provide an indication of the financial intensity of that
support. In situations in which support comes from outside the state or dis-
trict, from groups lacking local constituencies, disclosure may provide the
only information about the donors' involvement in the election.85
As I have previously suggested, the value of the information gener-
ated by disclosure has probably been overstated. Contribution information
may not be communicated effectively to voters. Even when it is, a voter
may not be able to use her vote to punish a candidate for accepting contri-
butions from sources she deems undesirable because, overall, she still pre-
fers that candidate. Still, there are likely to be some elections in which
donors are closely identified with a politically significant position, and
conflicting groups pour money into the war chests of competing candi-
dates. In those elections, disclosure could enable the voters to understand
what is at stake, 6 and nondisclosure of contribution data would reduce the
ability of voters to make informed decisions.
Disclosure may also provide information that is valuable outside the
electoral context. Campaign finance reports tell the public about the iden-
tity and intensity of support of an officeholder's financial backers-
information that may prove a useful framework for assessing legislative
votes and other official actions and, more generally, for evaluating the
connection between campaign financing and the behavior of government
actors between campaigns. Even with a limited direct impact on a
85. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Questions Raised About Donors to Georgia Lawmaker's
Campaign, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2002, at A6 (noting that Georgia Representative Cynthia MeKinney,
a congressional critic of Israel, had received substantial contributions from out-of-state Muslim and
pro-Palestinian groups, while her Democratic primary opponent, Denise Majette, an African American
woman like MeKinney, had received substantial financial support from out-of-state Jewish groups).
86. See id
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campaign, disclosure may enrich public understanding of how government
works and how decisions are influenced. Such information would be lost in
an anonymity regime. To the extent Ackerman and Ayres's plan reduces
the role of campaign contributions in influencing government, the inforna-
tion lost through anonymity is less important. But some information that
may help the public evaluate the actions of elected officials still will be
lost.
In addition to reducing information, anonymity-by eliminating the
opportunity for donors to leverage contributions into access, and by simi-
larly denying officeholders the ability to make access contingent on contri-
butions---could be a disincentive for many wealthy private donors to make
large contributions. Like a contribution limit, anonymity could reduce can-
didates' resources and, in turn, the amount of information that campaigns
provide to the voters. Candidates would also have to spend more time and
effort on fundraising. They will search for new ways of raising money and
evading regulatory restrictions. Self-funded candidates, who are not de-
pendent on private donations, would gain. Moreover, anonymity would
operate as a particularly odd kind of contribution limit. Only "access" do-
nors would be discouraged from giving. Ideological, partisan, and other
donors interested in actually influencing the election would continue to
make individual donations as well as independent expenditures. Thus, not
only would the volume of private contributions diminish, but also the bal-
ance would be tilted from inside-the-Beltway interest groups with contribu-
tions linked to their lobbying agendas toward more ideological and partisan
groups interested in shaping the face of government.
The secret donation booth would thus have a problematic impact on
campaign finance. Access contributions would be reduced, but ideological
interests would loom much larger in the diminished pool of campaign dol-
lars. That would be a potentially serious consequence if secrecy were
Ackerman and Ayres's only campaign reform device. But that is not the
case. Rather, they have harnessed anonymous donations to an ambitious
program of public funding. Under their plan public funds would offset the
loss of private donations and the tilt toward ideological contributions likely
to result from anonymity. The secret donation booth, thus, is intertwined
importantly with their public funding plan.
C. Disclosure or Anonymity?
The choice between a disclosure or anonymity regime is a close one.
The empirical question of whether anonymity can be maintained is uncer-
tain. Certainly, Ackerman and Ayres must develop some means other than
public disclosure for monitoring the behavior of blind trust staff. If moni-
toring can function successfully, then there is no reason to assume a priori
that anonymity cannot be maintained. Public skepticism, of course, may
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pose a greater barrier than actual evidence of structural flaws in the ano-
nymity system. Ackerman and Ayres still must persuade the public that
anonymity can be sustained.
Assuming anonymity can be made to work-a big if-Ackerman and
Ayres make a strong case that anonymity will do a better job than disclo-
sure of checking the corrupting effects of large contributions. There is, in
fact, little evidence that disclosure has discouraged any special-interest
contributors or that disclosure has curtailed the ability of donors to obtain
access, if access is their goal. Disclosure is a failed strategy for curbing the
effects of large campaign contributions on government integrity. Anonym-
ity seems far more likely to curtail the pay-to-play donations of access-
oriented special-interest donors.
Anonymity, however, also will reduce the amount of information con-
cerning ideological donations aimed at electing a candidate. Currently,
such contributions are likely to go to only one candidate per contest. Dis-
closure of the amounts and sources of such ideological contributions can
provide voters with useful information about candidates. Information about
ideological contributions would be lost under the Ackerman and Ayres re-
gime.
Is the probable discouragement of what Ackerman and Ayres call
"pork barrel donations"87 worth the new confidentiality to be accorded to
ideological donations, especially when the size of ideological donations
may grow under the increased contribution limits Ackerman and Ayres
also propose? That is difficult to decide. Pork barrel donations, as the
Supreme Court observed in a related context, involve the use of"'resources
amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace."' 88 Although the size of their political war chests
have "little or no correlation to the public's support for [their] political
ideas,"89 the campaign contributions of pork barrel donors can have an
enormous impact on both the electoral process and government action. Yet,
such donors typically have little interest in the outcome of the election it-
self. For them, an election is not a vitally important moment for democratic
decision making. It is an opportunity to get a foot in the door in subsequent
government deliberations or an occasion for officeholders to exploit do-
nors' needs for such access by extracting campaign contributions. Ideo-
logical donors, by comparison, participate eagerly in the election itself,
using their funds in order to influence electoral discussions and voter deci-
sion making.
87. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 171-72.
88. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990) (quoting FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
89. Id.
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Yet large ideological donations may be in tension with at least one
central strand of democratic politics-voter equality. Many ideological
organizations benefit from the financial support of their wealthy backers.
Their contributions, too, may reflect resources amassed in the economic
marketplace, not public support for their ideas, and thus threaten to give
some groups more say in the electoral process than their numbers would
otherwise warrant.
Nor is the line between pork barrel and ideological giving always
clear. Some pork barrel interests may also give for ideological reasons-as
when one candidate takes positions clearly threatening their material con-
cems-not for access. In such an election, they might give generously even
if their giving has to be anonymous, but the voters would be unaware of
their role in financing the candidate they are backing.
It is uncertain whether anonymity or disclosure is the better approach.
Given the central role disclosure has long played in the American cam-
paign finance regime, Ackerman and Ayres may not have done quite
enough to displace it at the national level. But I hope that reformers read
this book and experiment with anonymity systems at the state and local
levels. State and local campaign financing schemes may test the functional-
ity of anonymity and assess its practical impact on contribution practices.
If anonymity works at the state or local level, it could then be tried in fed-
eral elections. Ackerman and Ayres persuasively show that anonymity is
worth a try at the subnational level, even if the case for a federal-level
switch has not quite been made yet.
The choice between anonymity and disclosure is a difficult one; it is
also tempting to say that it is, ultimately, not a very important one. Neither
anonymity nor disclosure actually do anything to address the dependence
of candidates on private wealth (their own or that of their large donors), the
lack of financial competitiveness that marks so many elections, or the bur-
dens of fundraising that fall upon candidates. We know from the experi-
ence of the last thirty years that disclosure fails on all these counts. But
anonymity is unlikely to do better. Under a regime of anonymity, candi-
dates would still depend on private donations to fund their campaigns.
Moreover, without access donations, candidates would need to spend more
time and effort on fundraising. They would remain under pressure to shape
their positions to win the financial support of politically active interest
groups. The wealthy, the organized, and groups with interests at stake in
the political process would still be the focal point of fundraising. Indeed,
with elected officials no longer able to "sell" access to donors, they might
be compelled to pander even more strongly to the interests of donors and
potential donors. Although anonymity might reduce the flow of access-
oriented funds to incumbents, it would do nothing to help challengers raise
money. With studies suggesting that the ability of challengers to raise a
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critical mass of funds at the beginning of an electoral race is more crucial
than their ability to financially match incumbents,90 the anonymity system
would do little to promote competitive elections.
At its best, then, anonymity alone would ameliorate the worst implica-
tions of campaign fundraising for the integrity of government decision
making. But anonymity would do nothing to make elections more consis-
tent with the norm of voter equality or to reduce the dependence of candi-
dates on the funds (and views) of large donors. Thus, the more significant
component of the Ackerman and Ayres plan is the shift in campaign fi-
nancing from private contributions to public money.
II
PUBLIC FUNDING THROUGH VOUCHERS
A. The Patriot Money Plan
Ackerman and Ayres propose to reform the financing of federal elec-
tions largely, albeit not exclusively, with public money. Public funding is
not a new idea nor is the case for public funding difficult to make, despite
the unwillingness of Congress to enact a congressional public-funding pro-
gram. Public funding reduces the disproportionate influence of wealthy
donors and interest groups on elections and government decisions. It pro-
motes competitive elections by providing campaign resources to challeng-
ers and newcomers otherwise unable to raise funds from private donors. It
reduces the burden of fundraising for candidates, thereby making it easier
for more candidates to compete, for candidates to spend more time cam-
paigning, and for elected officials to devote more time to their jobs.9
The Ackerman and Ayres plan would differ from other forms of pub-
lic funding by relying on vouchers provided to registered voters, rather
than government grants to candidates or parties-the public funding
mechanism in the presidential election and in all state and local public-
funding systems.92 The voter would be able to contribute the voucher-
which Ackerman and Ayres label "Patriot money"--to federal candidates,
the political parties, or PACs that contribute to or make expenditures with
respect to federal candidates.93 In the first election cycle, each voter would
get a $50 voucher, of which $10 would be allocated to House of
Representatives races, $15 to Senate races, and $25 to the presidential
race. 94 These numbers would be adjusted for inflation in future elections.
90. See, e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 175-
78 (1992); GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980).
91. See generally Public Funding, supra note 16, at 568-83 (describing the benefits of public
campaign funding).
92. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 66-68.
93. Id. at 70-75.
94. See id. at 76-78. Ackerman and Ayres further provide that in a presidential election in which
the incumbent is running for re-election, $10 of the $25 presidential voucher is allocated to the
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The Patriot money plan would make public vouchers the dominant but
not exclusive form of funding campaigns. Candidates could still accept
private contributions. Moreover, unlike some reformers who want to drive
down the total amount of campaign money,95 Ackerman and Ayres aim to
increase campaign spending above current levels. A $50 voucher for each
of 100 million voters would generate $5 billion in public funds; in the 2000
election, private funding reached roughly $3 billion.96 Although the secret
donation booth could significantly reduce private donations-they guess-
timate that private donors will contribute no more than $1 billion-the total
of public and private dollars would still be $6 billion (well above current
levels), and public funding would predominate.9 7
Recognizing that many Americans may fail to use their vouchers or
that private contributions may not drop as much as they anticipate,
Ackerman and Ayres propose further measures to assure both that cam-
paigns are funded at adequate levels and that public money predominates
over private money in the system. If the combination of Patriot and private
dollars falls significantly below the pre-enactment baseline, the FEC would
double the size of the Patriot voucher in the next election cycle.98 In addi-
tion, if the combination of private donations and Patriot money actually
used dips so low as to constitute a "severe drought" during the election at
issue, the FEC would grant, periodically during the campaign, a "compen-
sating bonus" to each candidate in proportion to the value of the Patriot
dollars he or she has collected.99 Finally, in the event that, secret donation
booth notwithstanding, private dollars continue to constitute a significant
fraction of campaign money, the FEC would increase the Patriot allocation
in the next election (not the current one) with the aim of producing a two-
to-one Patriot-to-private funding ratio."'
Finally, unlike all other public-funding programs, there would be no
spending limit for individual candidates. A candidate could spend all the
Patriot and private dollars he or she could collect.
primaries and $15 to the general allocation. Id. at 79. There is no similar allocation of vouchers in an
open-seat presidential election or in House or Senate elections. Id. at 79-82.
95. See Public Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform, http://www.publiccampaign.org/
publications/CleanMoneyCampaignReform.pdf (claiming that a leading problem of current campaigns
is that they are "too expensive" and justifying the "clean money" program because it "allows the
greatest reduction in the cost of campaigns.").
96. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 83.
97. Id. at 83-84.
98. Id. at 86.
99. Id. at 86. The FEC would have this power only in the first eight years after the Patriot money
system becomes law. Id.
100. Id. at 89-90.
2003]
CALIFORNIA LAW RE VIEW
B. The Promises and Pitfalls of Vouchers
The principal distinctive feature in the Ackerman and Ayres plan is
the use of the voucher. Vouchers go directly to voters, who may use them
only to make contributions to candidates.' °' Thus, the analysis of the
Ackerman and Ayres program is less about public funding per se than
about vouchers.
1. Why Vouchers?
Vouchers would resolve two important interrelated operational diffi-
culties for any public funding plan, determining (1) which candidates
qualify for public funding, and (2) how much each candidate receives.
These two questions arise because multiple candidates may qualify for list-
ing on the ballot, but they may differ substantially in the extent of their
public support. Although one goal of public funding is to provide resources
for newcomers, outsiders, and challengers, some reformers are concerned
that public funding might artificially inflate frivolous or marginal candida-
cies. Funding all ballot-qualified candidates equally would divert funds
from the main competitors to peripheral candidates; funding all candidates
at the same rate would also either drive up the total cost of the public-
funding program or reduce the amount of funding any one candidate could
receive.
All public-funding programs have to reconcile competing concerns.
The goal of promoting electoral competition provides an impetus to low
thresholds and generous grants to challengers and newcomers. The goal of
using public funds to reduce the dependency of officeholders on private
donations pushes towards focusing the program on the financing of the ma-
jor candidates. Limited resources force the government creating a public-
funding system to confront trade-offs and choose between treating all can-
didates equally or allocating funds based on some measure of the
"importance" of the candidate.
Most current public-funding programs discriminate among candidates
by requiring a candidate to demonstrate a base level of support in order to
qualify for funding; many also set the amount the candidate ultimately re-
ceives according to some measure of private support." 2 In the presidential
101. Voters may give their vouchers to political parties or to other political committees, but parties
and committees may use the vouchers only to support candidates. See id. at 210-1I.
102. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. 19:44A-33 (providing for payments of public funds to gubernatorial
candidates who raise a threshold amount of $50,000; the amount of public funds paid to each candidate
is determined by doubling the amount of private contributions the candidate has received, up to $1,500
per contributor, and up to a total funding cap of $1,350,000 in the primary election and $3,300,000 in
the general election). See generally MALBIN & GAtS, supra note 45, at 56-59 (explaining that to be
eligible for public funds, "candidates must usually raise a specific amount of money, in small amounts,
from individuals who in some cases must come from specified geographical areas," and that most states
distribute funds via matching grants but some use flat grants).
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general election, for example, the nominee of a major party-defined as a
party whose presidential candidate received 25% of the vote in the imme-
diate past presidential election-automatically qualifies for a full public
grant. The nominee of a minor party-defined as one whose presidential
nominee polled between 5% and 25% of the vote in the previous presiden-
tial election-also qualifies for funds but receives a smaller grant based on
the party's share of the vote in the past election." 3 Other candidates receive
no public funding at all before the election, although a candidate who wins
5% of the vote is eligible for a postelection payment based on his share of
the popular vote.'o4
This reliance on prior party electoral success is, in several ways, an
inappropriate basis for determining the eligibility and amount of public
funding. The system burdens independent candidates with significant
popular support, like John Anderson in 1980 or Ross Perot in 1992, since
these candidates cannot cite to a party track record that would qualify them
for public funds. On the other hand, a good showing by a minor party in
one election can generate public funding for a much weaker candidate of
the same party with a completely different philosophy who is able to cap-
ture that party's electoral apparatus in the following election. For.example,
Pat Buchanan was able to convert Ross Perot's significant 1996 vote into
$12.6 million in public funds but less than half a million popular votes in
2000. Beyond the problems with relying on historical data, the statutory
thresholds clearly favor the major parties:0 5 Ralph Nader received nearly
2.9 million votes and 2.74% of the total popular vote but received no pub-
lic funds in 2000--either before or after the election. Moreover, prior party
electoral success is not even available as a funding criterion in primary
elections. Public-funding systems that support primary candidates typically
require a candidate to raise a threshold amount of private contributions in
order to qualify for public dollars.0 6 A qualifying candidate then receives
either matching funds, with each dollar of additional private funding up to
a ceiling amount per donor generating one or more dollars of public funds
until a cap on the maximum public grant the candidate may receive is
reached; 0 7 or all qualifying candidates may be given an equal flat grant.'08
103. 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (2002).
104. Id.
105. This campaign finance system was intentionally designed to favor major party candidates.
See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 98 (1976).
106. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 9033 (2002) (to receive public funding for presidential primaries, a
candidate must obtain $5,000 in contributions from residents of each of twenty states); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. 121A.060 (public funding for slate of governor and lieutenant governor in primary election
predicated on the slate raising $300,000 in qualifying contributions).
107. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 9034 (2002) (qualifying presidential primary candidates receive dollar-
for-dollar matching grant up to $250 for each private contribution until total funding cap is reached).
108. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 16-951 (2002).
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The Ackerman and Ayres voucher plan solves the "who gets them?"
and "how much do they get?' questions by delegating those decisions to
voters. Instead of government-set qualifying thresholds, flat-grant amounts,
and matching thresholds, rates, and ceilings, the voters individually choose
which candidates will receive their vouchers, and the voters in the aggre-
gate decide how much public money any one candidate will receive." 9 This
avoids the pathologies resulting from the use of historical party data in flat
grant systems for presidential elections. Pat Buchanan's public money in
2000 would have reflected the extent of public support for him in 2000, not
the public support for the very different views and personality of Ross
Perot in 1996. Conversely, John Anderson in 1980 or Ralph Nader in 2000
could have received public funds, notwithstanding the lack of a presidential
election track record.
Not only would these decisions be based on current political realities,
but also the possibility of government manipulation of the rules governing
eligibility and grant size would be avoided."' The Patriot money voucher
lets the voter decide whom to favor. Candidates would receive public fi-
nancial support only to the extent that they enjoy actual current public sup-
port. The only decision the government makes is the monetary value of the
voters' Patriot dollars.
Ackerman and Ayres urge that the choice of vouchers over govern-
ment grants directly to candidates has normative as well as operational sig-
nificance. For them, the basic rules of campaign financing should track the
basic rules of voting, including one person, one vote. As they put it, "It
isn't enough to count every vote equally on election day. The American
citizen should also be given a more equal say in funding decisions."'" But
equalizing voters' financial influence over elections could be accomplished
through government grants directly to candidates. Vouchers do not just
equalize. Rather, according to Ackerman and Ayres, vouchers increase
public participation in the political process by the creation of a new act of
political engagement-the transmission of the voter's Patriot dollars to her
designated candidates. They call this "the citizenship effect": "By casting
their patriotic dollars, Americans will be giving renewed social meaning to
their self-understanding as free and equal citizens, engaging in democratic
deliberation."'1"
2
109. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 210-12.
110. Although the usual assumption is that government will manipulate the rules to favor major
parties and incumbents, some systems equalize the funding for all qualifying candidates. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-951 (2002). In one state, the law favors challengers over incumbents. See 17
VT. STAT. ANN. 2855(b)(3) (1999) (legislating that public grant to the incumbent shall be only 85% of
the grant to a challenger).
Ill. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 4.
112. Id. at15.
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2. Problems with Vouchers
Ackerman and Ayres make an appealing case for the voucher ap-
proach to public funding. But vouchers have several serious operational
shortcomings. The normative benefits of a new form of public participation
may come at the price of frustrating some of the goals of public funding-
promoting electoral competition, leveling the electoral playing field, and
reducing the burdens of fundraising.
One problem with vouchers is uncertainty. The candidates' public
funding depends entirely on voters casting their vouchers. But just as we
have no idea how many people will vote on election day, candidates have
no idea how many voters will cast their vouchers, let alone the number of
vouchers each candidate will receive. Ackerman and Ayres acknowledge
this problem. Indeed, their program proposes all sorts of contingency plans
for increasing the value of the voucher in both future and pending elections
if "voucher turnout" is lower than expected." 3 These plans, however, are
primarily aimed at attaining a certain aggregate value of all vouchers and
securing an aggregate voucher-to-private funds ratio. This will not neces-
sarily help individual candidates. Yet some prediction of the likely amount
of public funding is crucial for campaign decisions-including the all-
important decision of whether or not to be a candidate. Challengers and
political newcomers depend on public funding, and, thus, they need to
know how much public money they are likely to get. With flat-grant sys-
tems, they know exactly how much they will receive once they qualify for
the funding. The uncertainty of funding inherent in a voucher plan may
discourage some candidates from entering races and thus diminish electoral
competitiveness.
Second, a voucher plan will likely reward early popularity. Early
money is critical to an election campaign, particularly for a newcomer or a
challenger. The central challenge for such a candidate is getting the atten-
tion of the media and the voters. For an unknown candidate, the media
challenge likely requires considerable upfront spending. It takes money to
build support. But under the voucher plan it takes support to get money.
Without some initial public recognition, how will the candidate collect the
funds necessary to build support?'"' Famous candidates, incumbents, or
candidates who enjoy the backing of significant political organizations can
escape from this Catch-22 and raise the money that will enable them to
113. Id. at 83-90.
114. Ackerman and Ayres are aware of the importance of early money. They allow a candidate to
accept a limited amount of private contributions to an "exploratory committee" that do not pass through
the blind trust applicable to all other private contributions. See id. at 206-07. They provide that the first
5% of all Patriot vouchers available in a House-election cycle, Senate-election cycle, or presidential-
election cycle which are actually transferred to candidates are to be doubled in value. See id. at 211.
This rewards successful early fundraising, but it does not make it any easier and thus might actually
help incumbents over challengers.
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mount the campaigns that will enable them to raise more money. For new-
comers, challengers, and others without strong start-up financing, however,
this is likely to be more difficult. One of the benefits of public funding is
that it offsets the advantages of incumbency or celebrity by offering all
qualifying candidates substantial upfront funding. Patriot funding throws
that possibility away.
Third, although vouchers reflect voter equality, they may fail to pro-
mote candidate equality. Flat-grant plans, such as the one now used to fund
candidates in the presidential general election, typically assure that major
contenders have equal funding." 5 Although they may discriminate against
minor-party challengers, they also reflect the reality that the vast majority
of general elections are two-party races. Flat grants boost competition by
assuring that the incumbent has a well-financed major party challenger,
and that both major parties are able to mount meaningful efforts in all
states and districts. Flat grants can greatly increase the number of competi-
tive elections. With the voucher plan, not only is the incumbent or the more
famous candidate likely to shoot ahead in fundraising at the start, but there
is no guarantee that the candidates will ever be funded equally. In states or
districts dominated by one party or a strong incumbent, the challenger may
be significantly financially outclassed. Once again, the Ackerman and
Ayres plan fails to make use of public funding's potential to level the fi-
nancial playing field.
Fourth, the voucher plan both diverts a significant portion of public
money into fundraising and will require that candidates devote a significant
portion of their campaign time and effort to fundraising. With flat-grant
public funding, all public dollars come without additional candidate effort
once the candidate has qualified. To be sure, fundraising may overlap with
campaigning. The target audience for both fundraising and campaigning
may turn out to be the same-the entire electorate, or at least that half of
the electorate likely to vote-although it is also possible that only a small
subset of voters ordinarily will cast their vouchers. Still, vouchers pressure
candidates to shape their campaigns to include an express or implicit pitch
for money as well as for votes. Patriot money would thus be far less effec-
tive than flat grants in promoting electoral competition and reducing the
burdens of fundraising.
The differences between the voucher and matching funds programs
are less substantial. As with a voucher system, the total amount of public
funds a candidate can raise in a matching system is uncertain. Initially
popular candidates have an advantage, there is no guarantee of equal fund-
ing, and fundraising is still a campaign obligation. Still, matching programs
may have the edge over vouchers in some respects, such as helping
115. Some "clean money" systems go further and give all qualify'ing candidates equal payments.
See ARZ. REv. STAT. § 16-951.
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newcomers and reducing the burdens of fundraising. In most matching sys-
tems, the public matches are substantially larger than the $10, $15, and $25
vouchers in the Patriot plan, so that challengers can use public dollars to
more quickly get to the level of funding necessary to mount a meaningful
campaign. So, too, less effort will be expended to raise the same amount of
money in systems which permit and match donations above the $25 level.
Moreover, matching systems need not provide simply a dollar-for-dollar
match. New York City matches private contributions at a four-to-one ratio
up to a ceiling.' 6 This has been a very effective tool for boosting political
newcomers and enabling them to get their message before the voters while
also reducing the burdens of fundraising."
The operational problems of vouchers flow directly from Ackerman
and Ayres's vision of campaign funding as a participatory democratic act
akin to voting. Although campaigns and their financing are closely inter-
twined with elections,' 8 the campaign is not the same as the election itself,
and a campaign contribution is not the same as a ballot. The election is a
distinct moment in time when the entire polity collectively decides who
will govern it for the next term of office. That decision comes only after an
extended period of agenda setting, issue development, and communications
by candidates, parties, political committees, and the media-the period
known as the election campaign. During that period of discussion, debate,
and deliberation, views may shift, the relative popularity of competing con-
tenders may reverse, and voters may change their minds. Campaign financ-
ing is crucial; it shapes the ability of candidates and other political groups
to present their views and counter the views of others. Public funding that
gives challengers a substantial upfront grant and assures that the major
contenders have similar levels of funding can encourage more candidates
and enable newcomers to mount more effective campaigns against incum-
bents. By contrast, financing that relies heavily on initial popularity runs
the risk of reinforcing the initial differences in support and entrenching the
early favorites.
Ackerman and Ayres treat the financing of a campaign as an election
itself. But that misses the way in which campaign financing is both a dy-
namic process, in which early fundraising success may affect the flow of
campaign dollars later, and a critical mechanism for shaping the competi-
tion in the election held on election day. Recognizing that a democratic
election is predicated on the opportunity for candidates to present their
views to and interact with the voters, decentralized campaign financing
116. See New York City Campaign Finance Act, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705 (2002).
l17. See, e.g., MARK GREEN, SELLING OUT: HOW BIG CORPORATE MONEY BUYS
ELECTIONS, RAMS THROUGH LEGISLATION, AND BETRAYS OUR DEMOCRACY 247-56 (2002).
118. See Issue Advocacy, supra note 4, at 1769 (observing that "[t]he election campaign is a
central part of the process of structured choice and democratic deliberation that constitutes an
election").
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through vouchers may be less likely to generate a democratic election than
a public financing system that involves a conscious government effort to
assure timely and adequate financing for the principal contenders.
The participatory democratic aspect of vouchers may also be over-
stated. We have no way of knowing how many voters will use their vouch-
ers, particularly in less visible elections like those for the House of
Representatives. Assuming that voucher voting is unlikely to exceed elec-
tion day voting, about half the electorate will cast presidential vouchers and
about one-third or so will use Patriot money in congressional elections." 9
More likely, without the significance of an election day to focus attention
on a particular point in time and without the special rituals that have devel-
oped concerning election day participation, voucher turnout is likely to be
lower than ballot turnout-perhaps just 20-25% in House of
Representatives races. This group may not be a representative subsection
of the electorate, but may, instead, be skewed in favor of certain groups,
such as the more educated or those with more intense political views.
Indeed, political intensity might affect the timing of voucher voting
even more than the rate of participation. Voters will almost certainly liken
their voucher voting to their ballot voting. Moderates may take more time
to make up their minds and may cast their vouchers only as they are getting
ready to go to the polls. Their vouchers would be of limited utility for can-
didates. By contrast, more intense partisans with strongly held views are
likely to make up their minds and cast their vouchers early. As a result, not
only will voucher usage reflect only a modest fraction of the electorate, but
it is likely to favor candidates backed by voters at the ends of the political
spectrum rather than the moderates who enjoy more numerous, albeit per-
haps less intense, popular support. This would still be far more participa-
tory than the current system, in which only a tiny portion of Americans
make campaign contributions, or than a system in which the government
makes grants according to a statutory formula. But a system in which the
most partisan and ideological fraction of the electorate dominates cam-
paign financing is not exactly a model of democracy.
To be sure, we have no idea how many people will use their vouchers.
Ackerman and Ayres contend that Patriot money will energize the elector-
ate to produce high levels of participation and higher levels of political en-
gagement. Indeed, vouchers could enhance election day turnout. To be
sure, it is not obvious that the opportunity to spend small amounts of
government-provided credits on candidates and political committees would
119. In 2000, 51.3% of the voting age population voted in the presidential general election.
Federal Election Commission, Voter Registration and Turnout, http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000tumout/
reg&to00.htm. Turnout in the 1996 presidential election was just 49.08% of the voting-age population.
See FEC, Voter Registration and Turnout - 1996, http://www.fec.gov/pages/96to.htm. Turnout in the
1998 congressional election was 36.4% of the voting-age population. See FEC, Voter Registration and
Turnout - 1998, http://www.fec.gov/pages/reg&to98.htm.
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spark a new sense of citizenship. But Ackerman and Ayres might be right,
and, if they are, the resulting sense of democratic empowerment might well
be more beneficial than the more financially competitive candidacies that
government grants would produce. At this point, we just do not know.
Moreover, voucher plans have an undeniable rhetorical appeal. They
certainly sound democratic, and they can avoid the "welfare for
politicians" label often pinned on public funding since the payments would
appear to come from the voters themselves rather than the public treasury.
As a result, a voucher plan might garner more public support than other
forms of public funding, although in recent years traditional forms of pub-
lic funding have not done badly at the polls, as the popular referenda adopt-
ing public-funding programs in Maine, Massachusetts, Arizona, and San
Francisco indicate. 2 As with the anonymous donation booth, it would be
desirable for some states or cities to experiment with voucher plans for
state or local elections so we could get a sense of voter utilization and
compare the impact on competition with more traditional flat-grant or
matching-money systems. Until then, however, given the predictable op-
erational problems that a voucher program would generate, it is difficult to
conclude that Patriot money represents an advance over other forms of
public funding.
C. The Mix of Public and Private Funds
One of the great strengths of the Ackerman and Ayres program is its
mix of public and private funds. Although public funding is the corner-
stone of their scheme, they would not require candidates to be funded ex-
clusively by public money. Rather, making use of the anonymous donation
booth, they would permit candidates to collect and spend private contribu-
tions as well as Patriot dollars. Indeed, they would lift the statutory ceiling
on private contributions to federal candidates significantly above BCRA's
new, expanded levels.
120. See Recent Developments in Campaign Finance Regulation: San Francisco Approves Public
Campaign Finance Proposition, Nov. 8, 2000, http://www.brook.edu/gs/cf/headlines/sf publicCF.htm;
MARK BRESLOW ET AL., REVITALIZING DEMOCRACY: CLEAN ELECTION REFORM SHOWS THE WAY
FORWARD 11 (2002) (noting that Maine voters passed a Clean Election Act by a 56-44 margin in 1996;
Arizona voters enacted a similar measure in 1998), http://www.neaction.org/revitalizingdemocracy.pdf;
Bates v. Dir. of Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 763 N.E.2d 6, 9 (Mass. 2002) (noting that
Massachusetts Clean Elections Act was "approved overwhelmingly by the people" in November 1998).
More recently, in the aftermath of a protracted legislative effort to avoid funding the 1998 Clean
Elections Act, Massachusetts voters approved a nonbinding resolution, placed on the ballot by the
legislature, that they do not "support taxpayer money being used to fund political campaigns for public
office." Recent Developments in Campaign Finance Regulation: Massachusetts Voters Support
Referendum Rejecting Public Campaign Financing, Nov. 5, 2002, http://www.brook.edu/gs/cf/
publicfin.htm. In the same election, however, a competing referendum which asked voters if they
supported "fully implementing and funding" the Clean Election Law was approved in all eleven state
House districts in which it was on the ballot. Id.
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On the other hand, Ackerman and Ayres are also committed to assur-
ing that public funds dominate campaign financing. They set the initial
value of the voucher at a level high enough to increase campaign spending
above current levels and to produce significantly more public funds than
private dollars. Their "swamping control"'' would go further and enable
the FEC to increase the value of the Patriot voucher to assure that even if
voucher use is lower than anticipated-or private contributions are
higher-public money would not be swamped by private dollars but would
always constitute at least two-thirds of all campaign money.
Their commitment to a mixed but predominantly public system that
would increase, not reduce, campaign funds is absolutely on target. Al-
though some reformers have contended that the one person, one vote prin-
ciple requires equal dollars per voter, 22 voter equality is just one of the
competing concerns that campaign finance law must reconcile. A campaign
finance system should foster the participation of politically engaged citi-
zens in the electoral process and promote a structure of lively electoral
competition. As Ackerman and Ayres note, contributions provide an op-
portunity for participation in the political process.'23 So long as some
mechanism like donor anonymity controls the corrupting effect of large
donations while public funding buffers the influence of large donations on
electoral competition, there is no reason to bar private money. Moreover,
private contributions can also foster electoral competition and the presenta-
tion of opposing viewpoints to the electorate. Any public-funding system
must have a means of determining which candidates qualify for funding.
Past voter turnout may have limited relevance to the current election. Opin-
ion poll data may lack legitimacy. In addition, those approaches tend to
favor those candidates or parties who start out ahead and make it difficult
for challengers, minor parties, and independents to break into the system. A
system permitting some private funding enables these contenders to launch
their candidacies by using their initially small but intense private support to
build the base necessary to take on an incumbent or other favored candi-
date, and to qualify for public funding.'24
Ackerman and Ayres's commitment to increasing the pool of cam-
paign money over current levels is equally important. Too often, support
for campaign finance reform is driven by the sense that there is too much
money in politics and that campaign spending is too high. But that is sim-
ply mistaken. Campaign spending is a tiny fraction-about five-hundredths
of one percent-of gross domestic product, and well under what
121. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 89.
122. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994).
123. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 33-34.
124. Id. at 36, 58-60.
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Americans spend on potato chips. 25 If anything, not enough money is be-
ing spent to inform and motivate voters and to create- competitive races.
The problem is not too much money but the private sources of funding
(and the attendant corruption danger) and the maldistribution of campaign
money in favor of incumbents. Rather than using the occasion of the adop-
tion of a public-funding system as an opportunity to cut spending, as some
reforms have done,' 26 Ackerman and Ayres would appropriately increase
the overall level of funding. Other public funding reformers should follow
their lead in seeking to use public funding to increase overall funding as
well as to include mechanisms, like the aforementioned swamping control,
that assure that public funds predominzite over, rather than merely supple-
ment, private contributions.
III
REFORM OR REGULATORY REVOLUTION: VOTING WITH DOLLARS AS A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE?
Both anonymous donations and the voucher form of public funding
are distinctly innovative approaches to the basic problems of campaign
finance.'27 Ackerman and Ayres work out the operational elements of these
concepts and provide a detailed statutory text for implementing their ideas.
They also address and propose model legislation concerning other aspects
of campaign finance, particularly the structure of the FEC. Not content
with being merely innovative and thorough reformers, Ackerman and
Ayres want to be something more-regulatory revolutionaries. In putting
forward their program, from their book's subtitle on down, they repeatedly
stress how their proposals constitute a "new paradigm" that reflects the
"regulatory revolution of the past generation."'28 They stress that the planks
of the traditional campaign finance reform platform-"[c]ommand and
control, bureaucratic subsidies, and full information [-] are part of the
125. SMITH, supra note 54, at 42.
126. For example, when Congress adopted presidential public funding in 1974, it set the baseline
grant to major party candidates at $20 million-or one-third of the campaign spending by Richard
Nixon just two years earlier and, more strikingly, only two-thirds of the $30 million spent by the
candidate who in 1972 suffered the worst defeat of any major party candidate in modem times, George
McGovern. The presidential election grant, which rises with the cost of living, did not reach the amount
in nominal dollars Nixon had spent in 1972 until 1996, or a quarter century later. See Public Funding,
supra note 16, at 586.
127. For an earlier elaboration and defense of the voucher concept, see Richard L. Hasen, Clipping
Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996). Professor Hasen's proposal followed a magazine article by Professor
Ackerman proposing that vouchers be used as the mechanism for providing public funding. See id. at
21 n.89; Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 AM.
PROSPECT 71 (1993). Although Professor Hasen provided a thorough theoretical defense of using
vouchers, he did not work out the details of a voucher plan, as Professors Ackerman and Ayres, with
Mr. Bemb6, did.
128. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 3.
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problem, not part of the solution."'29 By "command and control," they refer
to FECA's limitations on the amounts and sources of contributions and
expenditures. They clearly announce that their goal is "to distance
[themselves] from ... the great progressive goal" of "limit[ing] the amount
of private money flowing into campaigns."' 3° They "reject comprehensive
controls on private money"' 3'; in their view, anonymity can do the work of
regulatory controls. "Bureaucratic subsidies" are, of course, flat- or match-
ing-grant forms of public funding. Indeed, they blast traditional public-
funding systems as "centralized bureaucratic solutions"'3 in which "bu-
reaucrats give politicians handouts."'
33
It all sounds impressively revolutionary. Yet, the central tenets of
their claim to being revolutionary-the rejection of both command-and-
control regulation and a bureaucratized public-funding system-are belied
by the provisions of their program. Innovative as their proposal is, it is also
marked by powerful continuities with more traditional features of cam-
paign finance reform.
Thus, despite their rhetorical pounding of contribution restrictions,
Ackerman and Ayres would continue virtually every single contribution
restriction in federal elections currently on the books. Specifically, they
would restrict individual contributions to candidates, political parties, and
nonparty political committees, as well as limit the aggregate annual amount
any individual can contribute to federal candidates, parties, and political
organizations.'34 They would also continue the longstanding prohibitions
on campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions. 35 Indeed,
they would go further than current law by barring PACs from contributing
private dollars to candidates, 36 barring national political parties from trans-
ferring funds to state and local parties,'37 and restricting not just the total
amount an individual could give a candidate during the campaign as a
whole but also the amount the donor can give during any two-week period
during an election -year or four-week period in a nonelection year. 38 So,
too, while they repeatedly criticize the regulatory loophole-closing focus of
Senators McCain and Feingold,'39 Ackerman and Ayres devote consider-
able attention to "plugging the gaps" and writing regulatory rules that
129. See id at 4.
130. Id. at7.
131. Id. at9.
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 5.
134. Id. at 184-85,204.
135. Id. at 204-05.
136. See id. at 185, 205. PACs would be permitted to accept Patriot dollars from voters and
contribute those dollars to candidates. Id. at 210-11.
137. Id. at 185.
138. Id. at 203.
139. See, e.g., id at 7-8, 45-46, 119-20.
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would preclude donor or candidate evasion of the blind trust requirement
and their contribution limits. n Indeed, they copy precisely one element of
the McCain-Feingold approach to soft money by extending the blind trust
regulation to all contributions to the national parties. 4' As they note, with
the blind trust device, like FECA's contribution limits, "ongoing regulatory
work [is] required to protect the integrity of the system.'
42
To be sure, Ackerman and Ayres would generally raise the contribu-
tion limits well above even the increased levels that just took effect under
BCRA. 143 They would also vary the limits according to the office in ques-
tion-representative, senator, or president-resulting in dramatically
higher limits on donations to presidential candidates than under present
law. 144 In their system, the regulatory center of gravity would shift, with the
bulk of the work of controlling the corrupting effects of contributions
borne by the anonymity rule, not the contribution limits, although the com-
bination of the continuing ban on corporate and union contributions and the
new ban on corporate and union PAC private contributions suggests that
these command-and-control rules would still be doing a fair amount of
work. The contribution limits and prohibitions would be "regulations of
last resort,"' 145 not front-line defenses as they are currently. Yet, given the
plethora of new and continuing restrictions-not to mention the command-
and-control directive to contribute solely through the blind trust donation
booth-this seems less a revolutionary paradigm shift and more a reform
within the existing model of contribution restrictions and information regu-
lation.
Similarly, Ackerman and Ayres frame their case for voter vouchers
over grants to candidates in rhetoric that blasts grant programs as bureau-
cratic while exalting Patriot money as decentralizing and democratic.
Ackerman and Ayres, however, overstate the role of the much-maligned
bureaucracy in traditional public funding while they understate the powers
of the bureaucracy under the Patriot plan.
In traditional flat-grant or money-matching systems, the bureaucracy
has the relatively limited role of determining whether a candidate has met
the statutory criteria to qualify for funding, the amount of contributions the
candidate has obtained, and whether the candidate complies with the other
terms and conditions of the program. The key questions-who gets public
money and how much they get-are determined not by the bureaucracy but
by statutory formulas adopted by the elected representatives or, in states
and localities that have enacted public funding by ballot initiative, by the
140. See id. at 123-26.
141. Id. at 203.
142. Id. at 126.
143. Id. at 203-04.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 45.
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people themselves. Decisions made by elected representatives may not be
decentralized, but they are certainly democratic. Decisions made by voter
initiatives are both decentralized and democratic-or at least as decentral-
ized and democratic as decisions of voters casting Patriot dollars.
While bureaucracy plays only a minor role in determining who gets
how much money under traditional public funding, the FEC could actually
play a large role in determining how much money candidates receive under
the Patriot system. The FEC would not simply carry out the commands of
the Patriot money statute. Instead, the model statute gives the agency au-
thority to vary the value of the Patriot vouchers to assure that election
funding does not fall below a certain level and that public funds outpace
private funds by a two-to-one ratio. 146 Moreover, during the first eight
years of the program, the FEC would have the authority to adopt regula-
tions increasing the value of Patriot vouchers during a current election to
assure that the overall level of funding is maintained. 47 Finally, in deter-
mining both the overall amount of campaign money and the public-to-
private funds ratio, the FEC "may develop"'48 regulations that would in-
clude in the calculation of private money not just contributions to candi-
dates through the blind trust but "private communication" broadly defined
to include expenditures for what would currently be considered issue advo-
cacy. 1
49
Given the FEC's powers to alter the value of Patriot accounts and its
considerable discretion to determine the amount of private money in an
election, it is difficult to say that the bureaucracy will not have a role to
play in the Patriot system. Indeed, the bureaucracy would probably have
much more power than in other public-funding systems. That is not neces-
sarily a criticism; but it is inconsistent with the bureaucracy bashing that is
part of the Ackerman and Ayres case for Patriot money. 50
146. Id. at 218-19.
147. Seeid at 219.
148. Id. at 220.
149. See id. at 187.
150. My focus on the bureaucracy's role in the Ackerman and Ayres plan ignores their many
legislative rules and requirements intended to shape the value of vouchers and the benefits to
candidates. Thus, although Ackerman and Ayres begin by presenting their plan as one which gives
every eligible voter fifty Patriot dollars, they quickly move to constrain voter discretion by allocating
$10 to House races, $15 to Senate races, and $25 to presidential races, and by then subdividing the
presidential account into $10 for the primary campaign and $15 for the general election campaign. See
id. at 4, 9. But the subdivision of the presidential amount would only occur in years when the
incumbent President is a candidate for re-election. See id. at 209. Ackerman and Ayres also double the
value of the first 5% of the funds available in House, Senate, and presidential elections, respectively, as
an incentive to early Patriot donations. See id. at 211. These are all reasonable rules, but they belie the
claim that the Patriot plan decentralizes decisions to the voters.
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CONCLUSION
Ackerman and Ayres have presented a comprehensive plan that, by
combining bold innovations with meticulous attention to detail, addresses
the central issue of campaign finance: how to provide candidates with the
money they need for informing and communicating with voters without
also making elected officeholders dependent on special interests and
wealthy donors. By joining the anonymous donation booth and high con-
tribution limits to public funding, they would largely sever the tie between
private wealth and public elections. And they would do so by increasing,
not reducing, the amount of money available for campaign communica-
tions.
I have been critical of various components of the Ackerman and
Ayres program, and of some of the rhetoric that goes with it. It is not clear
that contribution anonymity is superior to disclosure. Vouchers are likely
to be less effective than government grants in promoting competitive elec-
tions. Although Ackerman and Ayres are right in seeking' to make cam-
paign financing more congruent with the democratic norm of voter
equality, they push the dollars-as-votes analogy too far. Campaign contri-
butions can affect electoral outcomes, but they are not votes. Rather, they
are part of the process of shaping the electoral debate, informing voters,
and presenting the personalities and views of the candidates to the elector-
ate. On the continuum stretching between general political activity and
election day voting, they are somewhere in between-closer perhaps to
balloting than to the general discussion of political issues, but still distinct
from the election itself. By relying on the dollars-voting analogy to insist
on individual voter allocation of public funds to candidates, they lessen the
ability of public funding to level the playing field between challengers and
incumbents and to promote competitive contests. So, too, in modeling the
"donation booth" on the voting booth, they run the risk of denying voters
potentially significant information about candidates' issue-motivated fi-
nancial backers-although they make a good case that anonymity (if main-
tained) would effectively curb access-oriented contributions.
Still, whatever the arguable shortcomings of the individual elements
of the Ackerman and Ayres program, the whole is greater than the sum of
the parts. Overall, their proposal represents a reasonable and pragmatic
reconciliation of the multiple and conflicting concerns-protection of po-
litical speech and association, voter equality, electoral competitiveness, and
checking the undue influence of large donors-central to campaign finance
regulation. If I had to choose between their program and the status quo on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, I would pick their plan in a heartbeat.
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Moreover, as they point out, the principal proposals'in Voting with
Dollars would all be constitutional under existing doctrine.'' Buckley v.
Valeo is often considered to be an immovable object blocking the path to
reform,' 52 but Ackerman and Ayres have demonstrated that far-reaching
reforms that would both promote democratic equality and check the cor-
rupting influence of large private donations are entirely consistent with
Buckley. In developing and working through a creative and comprehensive
campaign reform program, Ackerman and Ayres have demonstrated that
the obstacles to campaign finance reform are more political than constitu-
tional.
Voting with Dollars arrives at a critical time. The decade-long cam-
paign against soft money and issue-advocacy advertising has culminated in
a fragile victory which, if it survives court challenges and is vigorously
enforced-admittedly two very big ifs-opens the way to political consid-
eration of the next phase of reform: the provision of no-strings-attached
funds to candidates. Indeed, if BCRA is knocked out by the courts or evis-
cerated by the FEC'53 and very large contributions continue to flow without
regulation or restraint, the need to find new means of providing candidates
adequate no-strings-attached funding will be even more pressing.
Ackerman and Ayres have presented a plan that addresses that need in a
comprehensive and operationally detailed manner. Their book should
stimulate and advance public debate over this matter, which is so vitally
important to the health of our democracy. That alone is a noteworthy
achievement.
151. On the other hand, some of their other proposals-the ban on PAC contributions of private
dollars to candidates, the regulation of all contributions to national political parties, and the control on
the timing and pace as well as the amount of individual private contributions to candidates-are more
constitutionally debatable.
152. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 140-59.
153. The FEC has already taken steps to undermine BCRA's soft-money ban. See Richard
Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1205-08 (2002). For critical commentary on the FEC's soft-money rules,
see Stop Opening Loopholes, WASH. POST, June 22, 2002, at Al 8; Election Law Coup d'Etat, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2002, at A18.
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